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Footnotes
1. Charles H. Whitebread, Recent Criminal Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court: The 2004-2005 Term, COURT REVIEW, Spring
2005, at 26.
2. 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
As I noted in reviewing the past term’s criminal deci-sions,1 what turned out to be the final year for theRehnquist Court produced no blockbuster rulings.
Nonetheless, there were several civil decisions of note.  The
Court’s 5-4 ruling upholding the taking of private property for
economic development purposes and two First Amendment
cases involving public display of the Ten Commandments in a
courthouse and in a school were among those receiving the
most public attention.
FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS
In a 5-4 decision, in Kelo v. City of New London,2 the Court
held that the taking of private property for the purpose of eco-
nomic development satisfied the “public use” requirement of
the Fifth Amendment.  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of
the Court while Justice O’Connor led the dissent.  New
London, Connecticut was declared a “distressed municipality”
by the State.  Local and state officials targeted the area for eco-
nomic revitalization and “[t]o this end, the respondent New
London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private non-
profit entity established some years earlier to assist the City in
planning economic development, was reactivated.” The NLDC
formally submitted plans for the city’s rejuvenation and,
“[u]pon obtaining state-level approval . . . finalized an inte-
grated development plan focused on 90 acres of the Fort
Trumbull area.” The area targeted by NLDC comprised, in part,
“privately owned properties.” The plan was approved in 2000.
“The city council also authorized the NLDC to purchase prop-
erty or to acquire property by exercising eminent domain in
the City’s name.” Most of the private property in the area was
successfully purchased by NLCD; however, “negotiations with
the petitioners failed.” In December 2000, the petitioners
brought an action in state court, claiming among other things,
that the taking of their properties would violate the “public
use” restriction in the Fifth Amendment.” 
The Court began by restating the basic principles of a State’s
eminent-domain power: “On the one hand, it has long been
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for
the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B.”
However, “it is equally clear that a State may transfer property
from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’
is the purpose of the taking.” According to the Court,
“[n]either of these propositions . . . determines the disposition
of this case.” First, the property is not being taken for private
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purposes: “[t]he takings before us . . . would be executed pur-
suant to a carefully considered development plan,” and there
was no evidence that the City’s purposes are illegitimate.
Second, “this is not a case in which the City is planning to
open the condemned land – at least not in its entirety – to use
by general public.” Even so, the Court has long since rejected
that “public use” be determined by whether the land will be
used by the public in favor of asking whether the land will be
used for a “public purpose.” The question then, according to
the Court, was not whether the public will use the condemned
land, but whether the City’s development plan served a “pub-
lic purpose.” The Court stated that it has “defined that concept
broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to leg-
islative judgments in this field.”
After a discussion of its previous decisions, the Court stated
that the City’s plan for “economic rejuvenation is entitled to
our deference.” The Court also concluded that “[g]iven the
comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough delibera-
tion that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our
review, it is appropriate for us . . . to resolve the challenges of
the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in
light of the entire plan.” The Court declined to create a bright-
line rule that disqualifies economic development for “public
use”: “Promoting economic development is a traditional and
long accepted function of government,” and the Court saw “no
principled way of distinguishing economic development from
the other public purposes that we have recognized.” Further,
the Court recognized that, as here, “[t]he public end may be as
well or better served through an agency of private enterprise
than through a department of government – or so the Congress
might conclude.” 
Justice O’Connor, leading the dissent, believed the Court
has abandoned a “long-held, basic limitation on government
power” and the Court’s holding made all private property “vul-
nerable to being taken and transferred to another private
owner, so long as it might be upgraded.” She would hold that
economic takings are not constitutional because, generally,
“any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate
some incidental benefit to the public.” Justice Thomas, who
joined Justice O’Connor, also wrote separately because he
believed that “[i]f such ‘economic development’ takings are for
‘public use,’ any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public
Use Clause from our Constitution.”
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HABEAS CORPUS 
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in
Rhines v. Weber,3 which finally affirmed the federal courts’ stay-
and-abeyance procedure in the context of federal habeas peti-
tions filed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA).  The Court held that a district court may
issue a stay to hold a habeas petition in abeyance while the
petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his unexhausted
claims if the court believed: (1) there is good cause why the
petitioner failed to previously exhaust his claims; (2) the
claims are not without merit; and (3) it imposes a time limit
upon the petitioner in which to exhaust those claims.  The
petitioner Charles Russell Rhines was sentenced to death after
being convicted of first-degree murder and third-degree bur-
glary.  His conviction became final on December 2, 1996, and
on December 5, 1996, the petitioner filed his state habeas peti-
tion.  His request for relief was denied, and the petitioner filed
for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254
within the one-year statutory period.  Almost two years later,
the District Court determined that eight of the petitioner’s
claims had not been exhausted.  By this time, the one-year
statute of limitations had run.  The District Court, however,
granted the petitioner’s motion and issued a stay to hold the
petitioner’s petition in abeyance “while he presented his unex-
hausted claims to the South Dakota courts.”  The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit “vacated the stay and remanded
the case to the District Court to determine whether Rhines
could proceed by deleting unexhausted claims from his peti-
tion.” 
The Court determined that the stay-and-abeyance proce-
dure used by the District Court was appropriate.  In Rose v.
Lundy,4 which was decided fourteen years prior to Congress’s
adoption of AEDPA, the Court held that “federal district courts
may not adjudicate mixed petitions for habeas corpus, that is,
petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims.”
The Court reasoned that the interests of comity and federalism
dictate that state courts must have the first opportunity to
decide a petitioner’s claim.  When the Court decided Lundy,
however, there was no statute of limitations on filing a federal
habeas petition.  Therefore, it was relatively easy for the peti-
tioners to return to state court to exhaust their previously
unexhausted claims before returning to federal court.  The
“enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered the land-
scape for federal habeas corpus petitions.” The Court wrote:
“Although the limitations period is tolled during the pendency
of a ‘properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review,’ . . . the filing of a petition for habeas
corpus in federal court does not toll the statute of limitation.”
Therefore, many petitioners who come to federal court with
mixed petitions risk the loss of federal review of their unex-
hausted claims.  
To alleviate this problem, some courts had adopted the
“stay-and-abeyance” procedure.  The Court believed this to be
an appropriate remedy, stating that “under this procedure,
rather than dismiss the mixed petition pursuant to Lundy, a
district court might stay the
petition and hold it in
abeyance while the petitioner
returns to state court to
exhaust his previously unex-
hausted claims.”  The Court
went on to explain that typi-
cally, district courts have the
authority to enter stays
“where such a stay would be
a proper exercise of discre-
tion.”  The AEDPA does not
limit this power.  The Court believed, however, that the proce-
dure should be “compatible with AEDPA’s purposes: (1) to
reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal
sentences; and (2) require prisoners to seek state relief first,
thereby streamlining federal habeas proceedings.”  The Court
concluded that the frequent use of the stay-and-abeyance pro-
cedure would “undermine these twin purposes” and, therefore,
believed it should only be available in the circumstances dis-
cussed above: (1) where “the district court determined there
was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims
first in state court;” (2) the unexhausted claims are not merit-
less; and (3) the petitioner acts with diligence to exhaust his
unexhausted claims.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of a 5-3 Court in
Brown v. Payton,5 which held the California state court’s deter-
mination that the instruction given in a death-penalty trial
with regard to the “catch-all” provision of California Penal
Code section 190.3 and its failure to declare a mistrial after the
prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument was not
an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
The respondent William Payton was tried and convicted for
one count of rape and murder and two counts of attempted
murder.  During the penalty phase of the trial, the defense
focused on Payton’s actions after the crimes, in particular that
Payton “participated in prison Bible study classes and a prison
ministry, and had a calming effect on other prisoners.”  The
trial judge gave an instruction, which followed the text of
California Penal Code section 190.3, which “set[s] forth 11
different factors, labeled (a) through (k), for the jury to ‘con-
sider, take into account and be guided by’ in determining
whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or death.”
Factor (k), which is a “catch-all instruction,” directs the jurors
to consider “any other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the
crime.”  During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that
“factor (k) did not allow . . . [the jury] to consider anything
that happened ‘after the [crime] or later.’” The defense
objected and moved for mistrial on grounds that the prosecu-
tor misstated the law.  The court declined.  The jury returned
a verdict of death and the respondent was sentenced.
On direct appeal to the California Supreme Court, Payton
argued that the jury was “led to believe it could not consider
3. 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
4. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
5. 544 U.S. 133 (2005).
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the mitigating evidence of his
post-conviction conduct . . .
in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.” The California
Supreme Court rejected the
claim, applying United States
Supreme Court’s decision in
Boyde v. California,6 “which
had considered the constitu-
tionality of the same factor
(k) instruction,” and deter-
mined that “in the context of
the proceedings there was no reasonable likelihood that
Patyon’s jury believed it was required to disregard his mitigat-
ing evidence.” Payton subsequently filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the District Court.  
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), a federal court’s review is limited and it “may
not grant relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The
Court determined that the state court’s decision was not an
unreasonable application of the law.  The state court properly
identified Boyde at the commencement of its analysis.  In
Boyde, the Court held that the text of factor (k) did not “limit
the jury’s consideration of extenuating circumstances solely to
circumstances of the crime.” Therefore, it determined that fac-
tor (k) did not preclude “the jury from considering evidence
pertaining to a defendant’s background and character.” In this
case, the California Supreme Court interpreted this holding as
allowing both pre-crime and post-crime mitigation evidence.
The Court believed that, in light of Boyde, this conclusion was
reasonable. 
The Court also believed it was not unreasonable for the state
court to conclude that the “prosecutor’s arguments and remarks
did not mislead the jury into believing it could not consider
Payton’s mitigation evidence.” The defense presented “eight
witnesses, spanning two days of testimony” regarding the miti-
gating evidence.  For the jury to conclude that the evidence
didn’t matter would mean they had to “believe that the penalty
phase served virtually no purpose at all.” Further, “the prose-
cutor devoted specific attention to disputing the sincerity of
Payton’s evidence,” thereby drawing focus on the evidence. 
In Gonzalez v. Crosby,7 a 7-2 Court, in a decision delivered
by Justice Scalia, held that a motion filed under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) that challenges a District Court’s
previous ruling on the statute of limitations in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) is not a second or successive habeas petition and can
be ruled upon without pre-certification.  The petitioner pled
guilty in a Florida circuit court to robbery with a firearm.  He
did not file an appeal and began serving his 99-year sentence in
1982.  Within one year after AEDPA was enacted, the petitioner
filed two petitions for state post-conviction relief, which were
denied.  He then filed a federal habeas petition.  The District
Court dismissed the action as barred by the one-year statute of
limitations.  It concluded that “the limitations period was not
tolled during the 163-day period while the petitioner’s second
motion for state post-conviction relief was pending” because
“Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the statute of limitations during the
pendency of ‘properly filed’ applications only.” The second peti-
tion, according to the District Court, “was not ‘properly filed’
because it was both untimely and successive.” The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit “denied a certificate of appeal-
ability (COA).” On November 7, 2000, the Court decided Artuz
v. Bennett,8 in which it held “that an application for state post-
conviction relief can be ‘properly filed’ even if the state courts
dismiss it as procedurally barred.” Approximately nine months
later, the petitioner filed in the District Court a pro se “Motion
to Amend or Alter Judgment,” contending that the District
Court’s time-bar ruling was incorrect under Artuz’s construc-
tion of section 2242(d), and invoking Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60 (b)(6), which permits a court to relieve a party
from the effect of a final judgment.” The District Court denied
the petition.  The Eleventh Circuit eventually determined that
“the petitioner’s motion – indeed any post-judgment motion
under Rule 60(b)(6) save one alleging fraud on the court . . .
was in substance a second or successive habeas petition.” 
The Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s categoriza-
tion of the Rule 60(b) motion although it affirmed the dismissal
of the petitioner’s motion. “Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek
relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case,
under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake,
and newly discovered evidence.” Rule 60(b)(6), under which
the petitioner moved, “permits reopening when the movant
shows ‘any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment’ other than the more specific circumstances set out in
Rule 60(b)(1)-(5).” AEDPA does not “expressly circumscribe
the operation of Rule 60(b).” In fact, 28 U.S.C. section 2254
states the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable “‘to the extent
that . . . [they are] not inconsistent with’ applicable federal
statutory provisions and rules.” The initial question the Court
answered was whether a Rule 60(b) motion is a habeas petition
because “section 2254(b) applies only where the court acts
pursuant to a prisoner’s ‘application’ for a writ of habeas cor-
pus.” The Court believed “it is clear that for the purposes of
section 2244(b) an ‘application’ for habeas relief is a filing that
contains one or more ‘claims.’” According the Court, “a ‘claim’
as used in section 2244(b) is an asserted federal basis for relief
from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” It concluded that
“[i]n some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will contain one or
more ‘claims.’” The Court believed, as did most Courts of
Appeals, that in these instances, “a Rule 60(b) motion, is in
substance a successive habeas petition and should be treated
accordingly.” To hold otherwise would circumvent the require-
ments of AEDPA.  However, the Court believed that “when a
Rule 60(b) motion attacks not the substance of the federal
court’s resolution of a claim on the merits but some defect in
6. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
7. 125 S.Ct. 2641 (2005).
8. 531 U.S. 4 (2000).
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the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, there is no basis
for contending that the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated
like a habeas corpus application.”  According to the Court,
“[A]llowing the motion to proceed as denominated creates no
inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules.” The Court
believed that the petitioner’s motion fits within this category.
The motion “confines itself not only to the first federal habeas
petition, but to a non-merits aspect of the first federal habeas
proceeding.” 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,9 a 7-2 Court, in an opin-
ion written by Justice Scalia, held that an individual does not
have a property interest in having the police enforce a restrain-
ing order even where police have probable cause to believe the
restraining order has been violated.  The respondent in this
case obtained a restraining order against her husband from a
state court in conjunction with divorce proceedings.  On June
22, 1999, the respondent’s husband, in violation of the
restraining order, “took the three daughters while they were
playing outside the family home.” The respondent contacted
the Castle Rock Police Department numerous times during the
evening and into the night but was told that there was nothing
the police could do.  In short, they refused to act.  At 3:20 a.m.,
the “husband arrived at the police station and opened fire with
a semiautomatic handgun.” He was shot and killed by the
police.  “Inside the cab of his pickup truck, they found the
bodies of all three daughters, whom he had already murdered.” 
The respondent brought an action under 42 U.S.C. section
1983, “claiming that the town violated the Due Process Clause
because its police department had ‘an official policy or custom
of failing to respond properly to complaints of restraining
order violations’ and ‘tolerated the non-enforcement of
restraining orders by its police officers.’” The complaint also
alleged “that the town’s actions ‘were taken either willfully,
recklessly or with such gross negligence as to indicate wonton
disregard and deliberate indifference to’ the respondent’s civil
rights.” The District Court dismissed the action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the
respondent had alleged a cognizable procedural due process
claim. 
The Court disagreed.  The Court stated that it “left a simi-
lar question unanswered” in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dept. of Social Servs.,10 where it “held that the so-called ‘sub-
stantive’ component of the Due Process Clause does not
require the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors.” The Court did not
answer whether “child protection statutes gave [him] an ‘enti-
tlement’ to receive protective services in accordance with the
terms of the statute, an entitlement which would enjoy due
process protection.” According to the Court, “[t]he procedural
aspect of the Due Process Clause does not protect everything
that might be described as a ‘benefit’: ‘To have a property inter-
est in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire and
‘more than a unilateral expec-
tation of it.’” Instead, “[h]e
must . . . have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.”
These entitlements are not
created by the Constitution
but by state law.  The Court
had previously held that a
benefit is not an entitlement
“if government officials may
grant or deny it in their dis-
cretion.” 
The Court believed “[t]he critical language in the restrain-
ing order did not come from any part of the order itself (which
was signed by the state-court trial judge and directed to the
restrained party . . . ), but from the preprinted notice to law-
enforcement personnel that appeared on the back of the
order.” The notice essentially restated the statute “describing
‘peace officers’ duties’ related to the crime of violation of a
restraining order.” The Court believed that the language,
which creates the grounds upon which the respondent’s hus-
band “could be arrested, criminally prosecuted, and held in
contempt,” does not make “enforcement of restraining orders
mandatory.” According to the Court and its precedent, discre-
tion in law enforcement, despite “seemingly mandatory leg-
islative commands,” is “deep-rooted.” Therefore, “a true man-
date of police action would require some stronger indication
from the Colorado Legislature.” The Court also believed that
even if it did find that the statute created an entitlement, “it is
by no means clear that an individual entitlement to enforce-
ment of a restraining order could constitute a ‘property’ inter-
est for purposes of the Due Process Clause.” It did not resem-
ble “any traditional conception of property.” According to the
Court, it differed significantly in the fact that “the alleged
property interest here arises incidentally, not out of some new
species of government benefit or service, but out of a function
that government actors have always performed – to wit, arrest-
ing people who they have probable cause to believe have com-
mitted a criminal offense.”
FIRST AMENDMENT
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,11 a 6-3 Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that the promotional
campaign funded by the beef check-off program, as authorized
by the Beef Promotion and Research Act, is government speech
and, therefore, is immune from a First Amendment challenge.
The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act),
“announces a federal policy of promoting the marketing and
consumption of ‘beef and beef products,’ using funds raised by
an assessment on cattle sales and importation.” The Secretary
of Agriculture, following the procedures set forth in the Beef
Act, issued an order for a “$1-per-head assessment (or “check
off”) on all sales or importation of cattle and a comparable
assessment on imported beef products.” The “assessment is to
Court Review 17
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be used to fund beef-related
projects, including promo-
tional campaigns, designed
by the Operating Committee
and approved by the
Secretary.” Since May 1988,
“more than $1 billion has
been collected though the
check off . . . and a large
fraction of that sum has been
spent on promotional pro-
jects authorized by the Beef
Act,” for instance, the trade-
marked slogan “Beef. It’s
What’s for Dinner.” The Beef
Board also “funds overseas marketing efforts; market and food
science research . . . and informational campaigns for both con-
sumers and beef producers.” Most promotional messages bear
the attribution “Funded by America’s Beef Producers.” Further,
“[m]ost print and television messages also bear a Beef Board
logo.”
The respondents were two associations and various individ-
uals who pay the check off.  They brought a suit claiming “that
the Board impermissibly used check off funds to send commu-
nications supportive of the beef program to beef producers.”
While the litigation was pending, the Court decided United
States v. United Foods, Inc.,12 in which the Court held that “a
mandatory check off for generic mushroom advertising vio-
lated the First Amendment.” Because the mushroom check-off
program bore a resemblance to the beef check-off program, the
respondents amended their complaint to allege a First
Amendment violation.
Following a discussion of its First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the Court concluded: (1) “[i]n all of the cases invalidat-
ing exactions to subsidize speech, the speech was, or was pre-
sumed to be, that of an entity other than the government
itself;” (2) its “compelled-subsidy cases have consistently
respected the principle that ‘compelled support of a private
association is fundamentally different from compelled support
of government;’” (3) “‘[c]ompelled support of government’ . . .
is of course perfectly constitutional;” and (4) “some govern-
ment programs involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a
position.” The Court had “generally assumed . . . that com-
pelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First
Amendment concerns.” The respondents did not dispute the
conclusions drawn by the Court, but instead contended that
the promotional campaigns funded by the check-off program
“differ dispositively from the type of government speech that,
our cases suggest, is not susceptible to First Amendment chal-
lenge.” The respondents relied on two points for their argu-
ment: (1) private entities and individuals are the ones who
design the promotional campaign; and (2) “the use of manda-
tory assessment on beef producers to fund the advertising.”
The Court dismissed these arguments.  First, it concluded that
“[t]he message of the promotional campaigns is effectively con-
trolled by the Federal Government itself.” Second, the Court
found it irrelevant that the speech is “funded by a targeted
assessment . . . rather than by general revenues.” The Court
believed “[t]he First Amendment does not confer a right to pay
one’s taxes into the general fund, because the injury of com-
pelled funding (as opposed to the injury of compelled speech)
does not stem from the Government’s mode of accounting.”
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, dis-
sented.  He stated that the Court “unwisely” accepts the
Government’s defense that “the beef advertising is its own
speech, exempting it from the First Amendment bar against
extracting special subsidies from those unwilling to underwrite
an objectionable message.” He wrote: “The error is not that gov-
ernment speech can never justify compelling a subsidy, but that
a compelled subsidy should not be justifiable by speech unless
the government must put that speech forward as its own.”
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of a 6-3 Court in
Clingman v. Beaver,13 except in II-A of the opinion, where he
wrote only for the plurality.  The Court held the First
Amendment does not prevent a state from declining to allow
voters who are registered in a certain party to vote in the pri-
maries of another party.  “Oklahoma’s election laws provide
that only registered members of a political party may vote in
the party’s primary . . . unless the party opens its primary to reg-
istered Independents as well.” In May 2000, the Libertarian
Party of Oklahoma (LPO) informed the State Election Board
that it was opening its primaries to all voters.  The Board agreed
as to all voters registered as Independent, but not voters regis-
tered with other parties.  “The LPO and several Republican and
Democratic voters then sued for declaratory and injunctive
relief in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, alleging that Oklahoma’s semi-closed
primary law unconstitutionally burdens their First Amendment
right to freedom of political association.” After a trial, “the dis-
trict court found that Oklahoma’s semi-closed primary system
did not severely burden the respondents’ associational rights.”
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.  It con-
cluded that “the State’s semi-closed primary statute imposed a
severe burden on the respondents’ associational rights, and
thus was constitutional only if the statute was narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest.” The Tenth Circuit did not
find any of the State’s interests compelling.  
The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals.  “The
Constitution grants states broad power to prescribe the ‘time,
places, and manner of holding elections for senators and repre-
sentatives,’ . . . which power is matched by state control over
the election process for state offices.” While regulations that
impose severe burdens on associational rights must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, if a regula-
tion only imposes a “lesser burden,” a state’s important regula-
tory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.  In Tashjian v. Republican Party
of Connecticut,14 the Court struck down a closed primary sys-
tem that prevented a political party from inviting Independent
voters to vote in the party’s primary as inconsistent with the
14. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).12. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
13. 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
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First Amendment.  This case asked the question left open in
Tashjian: “whether a State may prevent a political party from
inviting registered voters of other parties to vote in its primary.”
The Court thought the burdens in Clingman were dissimilar
to those in Tashjian.  In Tashjian, the Court identified two ways
in which Connecticut’s closed primary limited its citizens’ free-
dom of political association.  First, it required Independent vot-
ers to affiliate publicly with a party to vote in its primary.  In
Clingman, however, the voters “have already affiliated publicly
with one of Oklahoma’s political parties.” Second, under
Connecticut law, political parties could not “broaden opportu-
nities for joining . . . by their own act, without any intervening
action by potential voters.” The Court saw a similar burden
under Oklahoma’s law, but stated that burden should not be
considered “severe” by itself: “Many electoral regulations,
including voter registration, generally require that voters take
some action to participate in the primary process.” The Court
concluded that these minor barriers between voter and party
“do not compel strict scrutiny.” According to the Court, to deem
ordinary and widespread burdens like these severe “would sub-
ject virtually every electoral regulation to strict scrutiny, hamper
the ability of States to run efficient and equitable elections, and
compel federal courts to rewrite state electoral codes.” Instead
of commanding strict scrutiny when a state electoral provision
places no heavy burden on associational rights, “a State’s impor-
tant regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify rea-
sonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” In this case,
Oklahoma had numerous interests that the Court recognized as
important: “It preserves [political] parties as viable identifiable
interest groups, . . . enhances parties’ electioneering and party-
building efforts . . . and guards against party raiding and ‘sore
loser’ candidacies by spurned primary contenders.”
In Tory v. Cochran,15 a 7-2 Court held that since the primary
purpose of the injunction was invalidated by Johnnie Cochran’s
death but the injunction was still valid under California law, it
became an unacceptable prior restraint on Ulysses Tory’s speech.
Cochran brought a successful state defamation suit against Tory
and his associates.  When it became apparent to the state trial
court that Tory would continue to engage in the defamatory
behavior in order to “coerce” Cochran into paying “amounts of
money to which Tory was not entitled,” the court issued a per-
manent injunction, which, among other things, prohibited Tory,
his associates, and their agents or representatives from picket-
ing, displaying signs, placards, or other written or printed mate-
rial, and from orally uttering statements about Johnnie L.
Cochran, Jr., and about Cochran’s law firm in “any public
forum.” Tory appealed and the decision was affirmed.  The
Court granted a writ of certiorari to answer the following ques-
tion: “[w]hether a permanent injunction as a remedy in a
defamation action, preventing all future speech about an admit-
ted public figure, violated the First Amendment.”  However,
after oral argument, the Court was informed that Cochran was
deceased.  Tory agreed to the substitution of Cochran’s widow as
plaintiff.  Cochran’s counsel argued that the case was moot;
however, Tory argued that it was not.
The Court stated that
California law “does not
recognize a cause of action
for an injury to the memory
of a deceased person’s repu-
tation” However, neither
the Court or counsel for
either party discovered any
case law that suggested that
the injunction became
automatically invalid at
Cochran’s death, “not even
the portion personal to
Cochran.” However, the
Court recognized that at
the same time that
Cochran’s death made it unnecessary for them to explore the
petitioners’ basic claims because, “as written, [the injunction]
has now lost its underlying rationale.” The activities forbidden
by the injunction can not longer coerce Cochran to pay “trib-
ute” to Tory for desisting in those activities.  The Court con-
cluded, stating “Consequently, the injunction, as written, now
amounts to an overly broad prior restraint upon speech, lack-
ing plausible justification.”
In Cutter v. Wilkinson,16 the Court interpreted the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
which “is the latest of long-running congressional efforts to
accord religious exercise heightened protection from govern-
ment-imposed burdens, consistent with this Court’s prece-
dent.” Enacted under the Spending and Commerce Clauses,
RLUIPA targets two areas, land use and the religious exercises
of institutionalized persons.  Section 3 of RLUIPA, which
relates to institutionalized persons, was at issue in this case.
Section 3 provided that no state or local government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a per-
son residing in or confined to an institution, unless the gov-
ernment shows that the burden furthers a compelling govern-
ment interest and does so by the least restrictive means.  The
petitioners were current and former inmates of institutions
operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, who practice “non-mainstream” religions, includ-
ing Satanist, Wicca, Asatru, and the Church of Jesus Christ
Christian.  They asserted claims under the First and Fourteenth
Amendment and, after the enactment of RLUIPA, Section 3.
The respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds that RLUIPA
violates the Establishment Clause.  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2403(a), the United States intervened in the District Court
to defend RLUIPA’s constitutionality.
A unanimous Court, led by Justice Ginsburg, held that
Congress did not violate the Establishment Clause when it
enacted legislation that forbids a state from interfering with insti-
tutionalized persons’ rights to freely exercise their religion.
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof.”  In between the Establishment
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Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause “there is room for play
. . . some space for legislative
action neither compelled by
the Free Exercise Clause nor
prohibited by the
Establishment Clause.” The
Court determined that
RLUIPA falls within this
space: “On its face, the Act
qualifies as a permissible leg-
islative accommodation of
religion that is not barred by
the Establishment Clause.”
First, it found RLUIPA com-
patible with the Establishment Clause “because it alleviates
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise.” Second, the Act contains no provisions that make it
incompatible with the Court’s prior decisions: (1) “[p]roperly
applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the bur-
dens a requested accommodation may impose on non-beneficia-
ries;” and (2) “they must be satisfied that the Act’s prescriptions
are and will be administered neutrally among different faiths.”
According to the Court, RLUIPA only covers those persons
“who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are
therefore dependent on the government’s permission and
accommodation for exercise of their religion.”
In McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky,17 a 5-4 Court held that the Establishment Clause
required the removal of the Ten Commandments from the
county’s courthouses because the county’s real purpose, as evi-
denced from the history of its legislation, is based on religion,
despite a pretextual secular purpose.   Justice Souter delivered
the opinion of the Court.  Justice Scalia filed a dissent and was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas and
Justice Kennedy in part.
In 1999, the petitioners McCreary County and Pulaski
County, Kentucky, displayed in their respective courthouses
large, gold-framed copies of an abridged text of the King James
version of the Ten Commandments, including a citation to the
Book of Exodus.  In McCreary County, the display was in
response to an order of the county legislative body requiring
the display to be posted in “a very high traffic area” of the 
courthouse.  In Pulaski County, the Commandments were
hung because they were “good rules to live by.”  The ACLU
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and sought a
preliminary injunction claiming that the display violated the
“prohibition of religious establishment included in the First
Amendment.”  During the course of the litigation, the counties
changed their displays.  At first, both counties’ legislative bod-
ies authorized by nearly identical resolutions a second,
expanded display reciting that the Ten Commandments are
“the precedent legal code upon which the civil and criminal
codes of . . . Kentucky are founded” and stating several
grounds for taking that position.  When the district court
expanded its preliminary injunction to include the expanded
displays, the counties installed another display in the each
courthouse called, “The Foundations of American Law and
Government Display.” The counties argued that the display
desired to demonstrate that the “Ten Commandments were
part of the foundation of American Law and Government” and
“to educate the citizens of the county regarding some of the
documents that played a significant role in the foundation of
our system of law and government.”
In Stone v. Graham,18 the Court held that the display of the
Commandments in Kentucky’s public schools violated the
First Amendment’s bar against establishment of religion
because their display was for a “predominantly religious pur-
pose . . . given their prominence as an ‘instrument of religion.’”
The Court stated that the counties asked for a different con-
clusion here based on two arguments: (1) “that [the] official
purpose is unknowable and the search for it inherently vain;”
or, alternatively, (2) that the scope of the purpose enquiry
should be limited “so severely that any trivial rationalization
would suffice, under a standard oblivious to the history of reli-
gious government action like the progression of exhibits in this
case.” The Court stated that “[t]he touchstone for our analysis
is the principle that the First Amendment mandates govern-
mental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and non-religion.” The Court viewed the counties’
requests as one to “abandon”  the purpose test set forth in
under Lemon v. Kurtzman. 19 It stated that “[e]xamination of
purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes up
the daily fare of every appellate court in the country.” It also
made practical sense, “as in an Establishment analysis, where
an understanding of official objective emerges from readily dis-
coverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a
drafter’s heart of hearts.”  The Court stated: “Lemon said that
government action must have a secular . . . purpose . . . and
after a host of cases it is fair to add that although a legislature’s
stated reasons will generally get deference, the secular purpose
required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely sec-
ondary to a religious objective.” The Court continued to
quickly dispatch the counties’ argument “that purpose in a
case like this one should be inferred, if at all, only from the lat-
est news about the last in a series of governmental actions,
however close they may all be in time and subject.” The Court
responded by stating: “But the world is not made brand new
every morning, and the counties are simply asking us to ignore
perfectly probative evidence; they want an absentminded
objective observer, not one presumed to be familiar with the
history of the government’s actions and competent to learn
what history has to show.” 
The Court saw two similarities between Stone and this case:
(1) “both set out a text of the Commandments as distinct from
any traditionally symbolic representations;” and (2) “each
stood along, not part of an arguably secular display.” The Court
stated: “Stone stressed the significance of integrating the
Commandments into a secular scheme to forestall the broad-
cast of an otherwise clearly religious message . . . and for good
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reason, the Commandments being a central point of reference
in the religious and moral history of Jews and Christians.”
According to the Court, the counties’ displays “unstinting
focus was on religious passages, showing that the counties
were posting the Commandments precisely because of their
sectarian content.” Further, even their third displays, despite
the nonreligious names, enhanced the sectarian spirit.  The
Court concluded that “[i]f the observer had not thrown up his
hands, he would probably suspect that the counties were sim-
ply reaching for any way to keep religious documents on the
walls of courthouses constitutionally required to embody reli-
gious neutrality.” 
Justice Scalia dissented on the grounds that: (1) the Court
is incorrect in reading the First Amendment as barring the gov-
ernment from favoring religious practice; (2) “today’s opinion
extends the scope of that falsehood even beyond prior cases;”
and (3) “even on the basis of the Court’s false assumptions the
judgment here is wrong.” Justice Scalia looked at the history of
the United States, including recent episodes, to show how the
idea of monotheism is ingrained in our government.  He
argued that the Court’s decision expanded Lemon because “the
Court justifies inquiry into legislative purpose, not as an end
itself, but as a means to ascertain the appearance of the gov-
ernment action to an ‘objective observer.’”
In Van Orden v. Perry,20 the Court held the First Amendment
does not bar the display of the Ten Commandments on a 
monument donated by a special interest group when the State’s
reasons for accepting the monument were purely secular.
Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court
and was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
Justices Scalia and Thomas also filed concurring opinions.
Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Souter
filed dissenting opinions.
The 22 acres that comprise the Texas State Capitol are dot-
ted with monuments and historical markers.  One monolith
displays the text of the Ten Commandments, along with other
religious symbols and symbols of the United States.  The mon-
ument, as inscribed, was “PRESENTED TO THE PEOPLE AND
YOUTH OF TEXAS BY THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES
OF TEXAS 1961.” The petitioner Thomas Van Orden, a native
Texan, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, “seek-
ing both a declaration that the monument’s placement violates
the Establishment Clause and an injunction requiring its
removal.”  The district court held that the monument did not
contravene the Establishment Clause.  It determined that the
State had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and commend-
ing the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency
and “a reasonable observer, mindful of the history, purpose, and
context, would not conclude that this passive monument con-
veyed the message that the State was seeking to endorse reli-
gion.”  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 
The Court agreed.  The plurality believed that the Court’s
precedent relating to the Establishment Clause point in two
directions: (1) “[o]ne face looks toward the strong role played
by religion and religious tra-
ditions throughout our
Nation’s history;” and (2)
the “other face looks toward
the principle that govern-
mental intervention in reli-
gious matters can itself
endanger religious free-
dom.”  These two faces were
evidenced in the Court’s
cases invalidating laws
under the Establishment
Clause.  The Court had
pointed often to Lemon as
providing the governing test
in Establishment Clause
cases.  However, just two
years after Lemon was decided, the Court noted that the factors
identified in Lemon serve as “no more than helpful signposts.”
Many recent cases have either not applied the Lemon test or
“applied it only after concluding that the challenged practice
was invalid under a different Establishment Clause test.”
Regardless, the plurality did not think the Lemon test is “use-
ful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has
erected on its Capitol grounds” and believed, “[i]nstead, our
analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and our
Nation’s history.” The plurality first looked at Lynch v.
Donnelly,21 where the Court recognized that “[t]here is an
unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three
branches of government of the role of religion in American life
from at least 1789.”  In the end, the plurality believed that
Texas’s monument is merely an “acknowledgment of the role
played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage.”
Similar displays are common throughout America, even in the
Supreme Court.  They did not dispute that the
Commandments are religious in nature.  However, “[s]imply
having religious content or promoting a message consistent
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause.” The plurality recognized that there are
limits “to the display of religious messages or symbols.” It
referred to Stone v. Graham,22 where it found that a Kentucky
statute requiring the display of the Commandments in every
classroom had a religious purpose and was, therefore, uncon-
stitutional.  However, the monument in Texas “is a far more
passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the
text confronted elementary school students every day.” 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion because he would
prefer a holding that “is in accord with our Nation’s past and
present practices, and that can be consistently applied – the
central relevant feature of which is that there is nothing uncon-
stitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God
. . . or, in a non-proselytizing manner, venerating the Ten
Commandments.”  Justice Thomas, also concurring, wrote
because he also believed the Court should return to the origi-
nal meaning of the word “establishment.” According to Justice
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Thomas, “[t]he Framers
understood establishment
necessarily [to] involve actual
legal coercion.” Justice Breyer
concurs in the judgment.  He
believed that the Religious
Clauses of the First
Amendment “seek to main-
tain that separation of church
and state that has long been
critical to the peaceful domin-
ion that religion exercises in
[this] country, where the
spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom are productively
united, reigning together, but in separate spheres.”  In deter-
mining Texas’s monument constitutional, he relied less “on a
literal application of any particular test,” i.e., Lemon, “than
upon consideration of the basic purposes of the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses themselves.”  He believed that
in certain contexts, the text of the Commandments does not
convey a religious message but possibly a moral secular mes-
sage or a historical message – “a fact that helps to explain the
display of those tablets in dozens of courthouses throughout
the Nation, including the Supreme Court of the United States.” 
Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter dissented.  Justice
Stevens believed that the monument “is not a work of art and
does not refer to any event in the history of the State,” but
clearly just communicates a religious message.  He believed
“[t]he monolith displayed on Texas Capitol grounds cannot be
discounted as a passive acknowledgment of religion, nor can
the State’s refusal to remove it upon objection be explained as
a simple desire to preserve a historic relic.” The Nation’s com-
mitment to neutrality, as reflected in the Religious Clauses, “is
flatly inconsistent with the plurality’s wholehearted validation
of an official state endorsement of the message that there is
one, and only one, God.” Justice Souter, also dissenting, wrote
because he believed that the Court’s prior cases had made clear
that the simple reality was “that the Ten Commandments con-
stitute a religious statement, that their message is inherently
religious, and that the purpose of singling them out in a dis-
play is clearly the same.”
FEDERALISM
In Gonzales v. Raich,23 the Court considered California’s
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (Act), which “creates an
exemption from criminal prosecution for physicians, as well as
for patients and primary caregivers who possess or cultivate
marijuana for medicinal purposes with the recommendation or
approval of a physician.” California was only one of nine States
that has legalized the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.
The purpose of the Act “was . . . to ensure that seriously ill res-
idents of the State have access to marijuana for medical pur-
poses, and to encourage Federal and State Governments to
take steps towards ensuring the safe and affordable distribu-
tion of the drug to patients in need.” The respondents are
California residents who suffer from various medical condi-
tions, as well as primary caregivers who have sought to avail
themselves of medical marijuana pursuant to the terms of the
Act.  The respondents filed this action against the United States
Attorney General and the head of the DEA, “seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the fed-
eral Controlled Substances Act (CSA). . . to the extent it pre-
vents them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing
cannabis for their personal medical use.” Their claims are
based on the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and the
doctrine of medical necessity.
In a 6-3 decision, with Justice Stevens writing for the major-
ity, the Court held that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate even the local cultivation and
use of marijuana for medical purposes.  The Court began its
opinion with a lengthy discussion of the history of the CSA.
Its main objective was “to conquer drug abuse and to control
the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”
In particular, Congress sought to control “the diversion of
drugs from legitimate to illicit channels.” Therefore, Congress
enacted a “closed regulatory system making it unlawful to
manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled
substance except in a manner authorized by the CSA.”
Marijuana was and is classified as a Schedule I drug, which are
drugs that have a “high potential for abuse, lack of any
accepted medical use, and [the] absence of any accepted safety
for use in medically supervised treatment.” 
The respondents did not challenge the validity of the CSA
but instead argued that “the CSA’s categorical prohibition of
the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for 
medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” The Court
stated that to determine the validity of the CSA in these cir-
cumstances, “none of our Commerce Clause cases can be
viewed in isolation,” primarily because the Court’s under-
standing of Congress’s power “has evolved over time.” Initially,
“the primary use of the Clause was to preclude the kind of dis-
criminatory state legislation that had once been permissible.”
Then, “Congress ‘ushered in a new era of federal regulation.’”
During the new era, the Court has “identified three general cat-
egories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to
engage under its commerce power:” (1) “Congress can regulate
the channels of interstate commerce;” (2) “Congress has
authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, and person or things in interstate commerce;”
and (3) “Congress has the power to regulate activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.” The Court’s case law had
made clear that Congress can “regulate purely local activities
that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.” 
The Court focused on one of its prior cases as instructive of
the principles set forth above: Wickard v. Fulburn.24 In that
case, Congress had enacted a statute designed to “control the
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volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce in
order to avoid surpluses and consequent abnormally low
prices.” Fulburn was only allowed 11.1 acres for his wheat
crop but cultivated 23, claiming that the surplus was for use
only on his farm.  The Court determined that Fulburn’s culti-
vation of wheat for personal use was still within Congress’s
power to regulate.  The Court believed the similarities between
these cases were “striking:” “The respondents are cultivating,
for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which there
is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market.” Like the
agricultural law in Wickard, the CSA’s purpose was “to control
the supply and demand of controlled substances in both law-
ful and unlawful drug markets.” As above, “[h]ere too,
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would sim-
ilarly affect price and market conditions.” Further, Congress
was right to be concerned that the demand for marijuana in the
interstate market will “draw such marijuana into that market.”
The Court reasoned that “One need not have a degree in eco-
nomics to understand why a nationwide exemption for the
vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated
for personal use (which presumably would include use by
friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substan-
tial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily
popular substance.” 
Justice O’Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas in part, dissented.  She believed the Court’s decision
was incongruous with its prior holdings and “gives Congress a
perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.” She called California’s law an “experi-
ment” that should be protected “to maintain the distribution of
power fundamental to our federalist system of government.”
Justice Thomas also wrote separately.  He believed the respon-
dents’ use of marijuana “has had no demonstrable effect on the
national market for marijuana.” Under the Court’s rule,
Congress will be able to regulate “anything – and the Federal
Government is no longer one of limited and enumerated pow-
ers.” He also rejected the Court’s argument that banning the
medical use of marijuana is necessary and proper to carry out
Congress’s goals as set forth by CSA.
In Granholm v. Heald,25 a 5-4 Court, in a decision written by
Justice Kennedy, held that state laws that discriminate against
out-of-state wineries violate the Commerce Clause; they are
not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment even though it
grants the States the broad power to regulate the transportation
and importation of alcoholic beverages.  Both Michigan and
New York have laws which regulate the sale and importation of
alcoholic beverages through a three-tier distribution system,
meaning “[s]eparate licenses are required for producers,
wholesalers, and retailers.” The Court has previously upheld
“three-tier distribution scheme in the exercise of . . . [the
States’] authority under the Twenty-first Amendment.”
However, the Michigan and New York laws are before the
Court because they apply only to out-of-state wineries.  In
Michigan, in-state wineries “are eligible for ‘wine maker’
licenses that allow direct
shipment to in-state con-
sumers,” while out-of-state
wineries are not.  In New
York, in-state wineries can
make “direct sales to con-
sumers in New York on terms
not available to out-of-state
wineries.” Many small winer-
ies “rely on direct shipping to
reach new markets” because
they do not produce enough
product for wholesalers to
purchase it.  This case, based on a claim that the states violat-
ing the Commerce Clause, was filed by wine producers of
small wineries “that rely on direct consumer sales as an impor-
tant part of their business.”
The Court began its opinion by stating: “Time and again
this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circum-
stances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they man-
date ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state eco-
nomic interests that benefits the former and burdens the lat-
ter.’”  This rule “follows . . . from the principle that states
should not be compelled to negotiate with each other regard-
ing favored or disfavored status for their own citizens” because
they “deprive citizens of their right to have access to the mar-
kets of other states on equal terms.”  The Court found that the
“discriminatory character of the Michigan system is obvious.”
While in-state wineries can obtain licenses to ship directly to
consumers, out-of-state wineries cannot.  Although the New
York law is different, the Court found it also discriminates.  It
found the law “is just an indirect way of subjecting out-of-state
wineries, but not local ones, to the three-tier system” and
“grants in-state wineries access to the State’s consumers on
preferential terms.” 
The states “contend that their statutes are saved by section 2
of the Twenty-first Amendment, which provides:” “The trans-
portation of importation into any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”
The ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933 ended
nationwide prohibition by repealing the Eighteenth
Amendment.  Its aim was “to allow states to maintain an effec-
tive and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its
transportation, importation, and use.” The Court stated that its
“more recent cases . . . confirm that the Twenty-first
Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the
Constitution and, in particular, does not displace the rule that
states may not give a discriminatory preference to their own
producers.” Since the Court did not find that either State’s
regime “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be ade-
quately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives,” it
found that both run afoul of the Commerce Clause.  
In American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv.
Comm’n,26 the Court held that Michigan’s law that imposed a
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$100 fee on motor carriers
engaging in intrastate com-
merce does not violate the
Commerce Clause.  A subsec-
tion of Michigan’s Motor
Carrier Act imposed upon
each motor carrier for the
administration of this act, an
annual fee of $100 for each
self-propelled motor vehicle
operated by or on behalf of
the motor carrier.  The fee
was assessed only on motor
carriers that operate in intrastate commerce.  The petitioners
operated both interstate and intrastate commerce and both
claimed “that trucks that carry both interstate and intrastate
loads engage in intrastate business less than trucks that confine
their operations to the Great Lakes State.” They argued that,
“because Michigan’s fee was flat, it discriminates again inter-
state carriers and imposes unconstitutional burdens upon
interstate trade.”
The Court began its opinion by stating: “Our Constitution
‘was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together.’” Therefore, “this Court has
consistently held that the Constitution’s express grant to
Congress of the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States, contains a further, negative command, known as
the dormant Commerce Clause.’” The dormant Commerce
Clause “‘create[s] an area free from interference by the States’” 
. . . and prevents them ‘jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as
a whole’ by ‘plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce across
its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would
not bear.’” Under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court has
invalidated a number of state laws in the following areas: (1)
laws that “discriminate on their face against out-of-state enti-
ties;” (2) laws that “impose burdens on interstate trade that are
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits;” (3)
laws that “impose taxes that facially discriminate against inter-
state business and offer commercial advantage to local enter-
prises;” (4) laws that “improperly apportion state assessments
on transactions with out-of-state components;” and (5) laws
that “have the inevitable effect [of] threatening the free move-
ment of commerce by placing a financial barrier around the
State.” The Court found that “[a]pplying these principles and
precedents,” nothing in Michigan’s law offended the Commerce
Clause.  Michigan only imposed a flat fee of $100 on trucks that
operate within intrastate commerce.  This law does not discrim-
inate against out-of-state operators, “does not reflect an effort to
tax activity that takes place . . . outside the State,” and “[n]oth-
ing in our case law suggests that such a neutral, locally focused
fee or tax is inconsistent with the dormant Commerce Clause.” 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but would rest his
decision “without adverting to various tests from our wardrobe
of ever-changing negative Commerce Clause fashions.” Instead
he would “ask whether the fee ‘facially discriminates against
interstate commerce’ and whether it was ‘indistinguishable
from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this
Court.’” Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment but
because “’the negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the
text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved vir-
tually unworkable in application.’” 
Federal law required a Federal Permit for all motor carriers
operating in interstate commerce.  Michigan has a state law,
which provided: “A motor carrier licensed in this state shall pay
an annual fee of $100.00 for each vehicle operated by the motor
carrier which is registered in this state [i.e., which has a
Michigan license plate] and operating entirely in interstate
commerce.” In Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public
Serv. Comm’n,27 the Court considered whether the federal
Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted this state
law.  “The SSRS allows a trucking company to fill out one set of
forms in one State (the base State), and by doing so to register
its Federal Permit in every State through which its trucks will
travel.” The SSRS allows the State to demand the following:
“(1) proof of the trucking company’s possession of a Federal
Permit, (2) proof of insurance, (3) the name of an agent desig-
nated to receive ‘service of process,’ and (4) a total fee (charged
for the filing of the proof of insurance) equal to the sum of the
individual state fees.” In addition, “[t]he SSRS statute specifies
that a State may not impose any additional ‘registration require-
ment’” and provides, specifically, that “when a State
Registration requirement imposes further obligations, ‘the part
in excess is an unreasonable burden.’” 
In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the SSRS does not pre-
empt Michigan’s $100 fee because the latter relates to matters
that fall outside the scope of the SSRS.  The first question the
Court addressed was what SSRS means when it uses the term
“State registration requirement.” The Court concluded that the
interpretation was very narrow: they “apply only to those state
requirements that concern SSRS registration – that is, registra-
tion with a State of evidence that a carrier possesses a Federal
Permit, registration of proof of insurance, or registration of the
name of an agent ‘for service of process.’” The Court believed
that the language of the statute “makes clear that the federal
provision reaches no further.” The Court also believed that
Michigan’s statute does not concern SSRS’s subject matter.
First, “the Michigan statute imposing the $100 fee makes no
reference to evidence of a Federal Permit, to any insurance
requirement, or to an agent for receiving service of process.”
Second, legislative history shows the law was not established to
circumvent the federal statute.  Finally, “Michigan rules provide
that a Michigan-plated interstate truck choosing Michigan as
its SSRS base State can apparently comply with Michigan’s SSRS
requirements even if it does not comply with Michigan’s $100
fee requirement.” The truck owner could simply fill out a dif-
ferent form providing proof of a Federal Permit and another
form to comply with Michigan and SSRS’s requirements.  They
would not receive a state decal, but “nothing . . . suggests the
owner will have violated any other provision of Michigan law 
. . . [a]nd they have not demonstrated that Michigan law in
27. 125 S.Ct. 2427 (2005).
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practice holds hostage a truck owner’s SSRS compliance until
the owner pays” the $100 fee. 
IMMIGRATION
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a unani-
mous Court in Leocal v. Ashcroft.28 It held that a conviction
under a statute for driving under the influence, which does not
have a mens rea component, is not a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. section 16, requiring deportation. The petitioner immi-
grated to the United States and became a lawful permanent 
resident. Subsequently, the petitioner was charged under
Florida law and pleaded guilty to two counts of driving under
the influence of alcohol (DUI), causing seriously bodily injury.
He was sentenced to two and a half years in prison. While serv-
ing his sentence, the Immigration and Nationalization Service
(INS) initiated removal proceedings under section 237 of the
Immigration and Nationalization Act (INA). Section 237 allows
the Attorney General to order removal of an alien “who is con-
victed of an aggravated felony.” An “aggravated felony” includes
crimes of violence, as defined by 18 U.S.C. section 16, “for
which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” Section
16 defines “crimes of violence” as follows: (1) crimes in which
there is an element of “use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another;” or (2)
an offense that is a felony that “by its nature, involves a sub-
stantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”
The Immigration Judge determined that the petitioner was
removable. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  
The Court began by stating that section 16 directs the Court
to look at “the elements and the nature of the offense of con-
viction, rather than to the particular facts relating to the peti-
tioner’s crime.” The crime for which the petitioner was con-
victed is a third-degree felony under Florida law. Although the
statute required proof of causation of injury, it does not require
proof of “any particular mental state.” To qualify as a “crime of
violence” under the first part of section 16, the crime “must
have ‘as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another.” The
Court believed that focusing only on the word “use” is too nar-
row. Instead, “when interpreting a statute that features as elas-
tic a word as ‘use,’ we construe language in its context and in
light of the terms surrounding it.” Looking at the phrase as a
whole, the Court concluded that “‘use’ requires active employ-
ment.” The Court believed that this interpretation does not
include the use of force by “accident.” The Court also found
that Florida’s DUI statute does not qualify as a crime of violence
under the second part of the statute. It does not, according to
the Court, include “all negligent misconduct,” but “offenses
that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk
that physical force might be used against another in committing
an offense,” i.e., burglary. The Court concluded that even
though the second part of section 16 is broader, it cannot con-
strue it any more broadly than the first section since “it contains
the same formulation” with
regard to the “use” of physi-
cal force. The Court con-
cluded its opinion by stating
that it “cannot forget that we
ultimately are determining
the meaning of the term
‘crime of violence.’” It stated
that the ordinary use of this
term combined with “section
16’s emphasis on the use of
physical force . . . suggests a
category of violent, active
crimes that cannot be said
naturally to include DUI
offenses.”
In Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,29 a 5-4
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that the
Attorney General need not obtain the advance consent of the
“additional removal countries” to which an alien may be
removed except in the last instance where, if it is “impractica-
ble, inadvisable, or impossible,” then the Attorney General
may remove an alien to any country that gives its consent. The
petitioner was born in Somalia and remains a citizen of that
country. He was admitted to the United States as a refugee but
his status was terminated in 2000 due to a criminal conviction.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) brought a
removal action. The petitioner “declined to designate a coun-
try to which he preferred to be removed.” Therefore, the
Immigration Judge ordered him removed to Somalia. The
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and the petitioner did
not seek further review. Instead, the petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2241 “to chal-
lenge the designation of Somalia as his destination.” He
claimed “that Somalia had no functioning government, that
Somalia therefore could not consent in advance to his removal,
and that the Government was barred from removing him to
Somalia absent advance consent.”
The Attorney General determined an alien’s destination
after removal is ordered under 28 U.S.C. section 1231(b)(2).
In sum, the statute provided “four consecutive removal com-
mands:” (1) an alien “shall be removed to the country of his
choice” unless certain conditions exist (hereinafter,
“Subparagraphs A through C”); (2) “otherwise he shall be
removed to the country of which he is a citizen, unless one of
the conditions eliminating that command is satisfied” (here-
inafter, “Subparagraph D”); (3) an alien shall be removed “to
one of the countries with which he has a lesser connection”
(hereinafter, “Subparagraph E, clauses (i) through (vi)”); or
(4), if (3) is “impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible,” then
the alien “shall be removed to ‘another country whose govern-
ment will accept the alien into that country’” (hereinafter,
“Subparagraph E, clause (vii)”). The Court stated that it will
not “lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted
text requirements what it nonetheless intends to apply.” This is
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especially true if “Congress has shown elsewhere in the same
statute that it knows how to make such a requirement mani-
fest.” The Court concluded, therefore, that the statute does not
require by its terms that acceptance by Somalia is necessary:
the requirement that the destination country give approval
applies only to Subparagraph E, clause (vii), not Subparagraph
E, clauses (i) through (vi). The language of the statute is spe-
cific and no mention of approval is made in Subparagraph E
except as it pertains to the terminal clause: “[i]f impracticable,
inadvisable, or impossible to remove the alien to each country
described in a previous clause of this subparagraph, another
country whose government will accept the alien into that
country.” 
In Clark v. Martinez,30 a 7-2 Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, held that under 8 U.S.C. section 1231(a)(6), an
alien may be detained beyond the 90-day removal period, but
only for as long as is reasonably necessary to effectuate
removal. The respondents arrived in the United States from
Cuba in June 1980 as part of the “Mariel boatlift.” Pursuant to
8 U.S.C. section 1182(d)(5), they were paroled in the country
under the Attorney General’s authority. Until 1996, Cubans
who were paroled into the United Stated could adjust their sta-
tus after one year to that of “permanent lawful resident.”
Martinez and Benitez did not qualify for the adjustment at the
time they applied because of prior criminal convictions in the
United States. After their application, both men were convicted
of additional crimes. In both cases, the INS took the men into
custody and they were ordered removed. Also in both cases,
the men were detained beyond the 90-day removal period as
set forth in section 1216(a)(6). The respondents filed petitions
for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 “to
challenge their detention beyond the 90-day removal period.” 
Section 1231(a)(6) provided that three specific categories of
aliens “‘may be detained beyond the removal period and, if
released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision.’” The
three categories of aliens are: (1) “those ordered removed who
are inadmissible under section 1182;” (2) “those ordered
removed who are removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4);” and (3) “those ordered removed
whom the Secretary determines to be either a risk to the com-
munity or a flight risk.”  With regards to the second category,
the Court, in Zadvydas v. Davis,31 “interpreted this provision to
authorize the Attorney General . . . to detain aliens only as long
as ‘reasonably necessary’ to remove them from the country.”
The Court laid out its reasoning behind this decision: (1) the
word “may” is ambiguous, but suggests discretion; and (2)
there is a “’serious constitutional threat’” of “indefinite deten-
tion.” The question presented in this case is whether this rea-
soning also applied to the first category of aliens in section
1231(a)(6). The Court answers in the affirmative.  The Court
stated that the “operative” language in section 1231(a)(6),
“‘may be detained beyond the removal period,’ applies without
differentiation to all three categories of aliens.” The Court con-
cluded that this “cannot justify giving the same detention pro-
vision a different meaning when such aliens are involved.” The
“lowest common denominator,” or interpretation of the same
ambiguous language, must apply to all three categories of
aliens specified in the statute. 
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